Stitched By Brief!

Stitched By Brief!

Postby EsauKilla » Sun Apr 24, 2011 6:49 am


My story is a sorry one. I know that solicitors do not work for me, that their first allegiance is to the Law Society, The Crown, the public, then me. But that didn't stop me employing one to speak for me. After two de facto trials and after i had sacked said solictor i was found guilty of my alleged charges (the solicitor informing the judge where i was after being sacked!! That aint right is it?) Anyhow i'm due in court on Tuesday, do i dismiss the court as it was a de facto court i was found guilty under? What should i study before Tuesday??
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Re: Stitched By Brief!

Postby wanabfree » Sun Apr 24, 2011 11:19 am

Hi there, sorry to hear about the bad experience.

i would suggest watching the many video's by Marc Stevens,also go to,there is a court scritp you can hopefully make use of it's in the template section.

look up anything on abuse of process,and also case rulings on your right to a fair hearing,i did post up ealier a short exerp on on juditial review.

you havn't said whether this was considereda criminal or civil matter,the level of proof changes in these matters and so does there level of standing.

what ever the charge they must provide evidence of a cause of action,and that means fullfillig the relevent elements,it's likely they never were in the original hearing.
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Re: Stitched By Brief!

Postby ArturoDekko » Sun Apr 24, 2011 10:38 pm

Post the court details, there may be some freemen near who can at least support you. Even if you stand there alone, know that we are all with you in spirit. No matter what the judgement, if your spirit is undiminished, you have won.
Love and Light :love: :sun:

Know yourself and you shall know the truth. The truth shall set you free.
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Re: Stitched By Brief!

Postby EsauKilla » Mon Apr 25, 2011 6:12 am

Thanks for Replying

First of all this is a criminal matter, i have cctv evidence which totally contradicts the evidence of ALL the witnesses (police included), the parasite who i had representing me did not even give my witnessses' details to CPS so they have not recognised her statement. I don't believe they provided evidence of cause of action. The CPS had four witnesses, they gave their testimonies before lunch, i took ill during the lunch break, sacked brief, went to hospital, foned the court, they said i'm back in court 26th April. Then i went to see my probation officer who then informed me i have been convicted even though my evidence and that of my witness were not heard. Im going tomorrow to go down the road of total dismissal of the case. Take It Over. Dismiss everyone and dismiss the case. Is this the right road to go down?

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Re: Stitched By Brief!

Postby wanabfree » Mon Apr 25, 2011 11:39 am

your best bet is also get down to your local CAB offices,they should be able to help you with how to go about it,you could also get a free consult with a solicitor, you can obviouly file an apeal,i'm not too clued up just yet, on whether this would still involve fileing a motion to dismiss, but it seems the most likely route, but best to check first with CAB.

The fact you say,you evidence that can alter the original decision is significant,and also the fact you were taken ill and unable to properly defend yourself all these are solid grounds to have your conviction quashed,you just have to go through the bullshit procedure to achieve this.

below is a little info for you, also get onto the marcstevens forum,and ask a few questions they are generally better at explaining court procedure for you.

Please pardon my bad spelling this is work in progress,but the caes cited are of importance so i feel I should post these up for everyones possible benefit.

here's a short extract....hope you all find it helpful.

Grounds for Judicial Review

In the GCHQ case (below) Lord Diplock said: “…one can classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review.

The first ground I would call” illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”.

(1) Illegality (or want of jurisdiction): the body has acted ultra vires, that is, beyond its powers.
(2) Irrationality ( wednesbury unreasonableness): associated provincial picture houses ltd v wednesbury corporation ( 1948 ) Lord Green MR explained that a body is obliged to reach a decision on reasonable grounds,takeing account of the appropriate legal rules and relevant facts and excluding irrelevant issues.
In council of civil service unions v minister for civil service (1985) the (GCHQ case) in which employees of the Government communications Headquarters challenged a government decision to deprive them the right to be members of a trade union, Lord Diplock described an unreasonable decision as: “a decision which is so outrageous in it’s defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”
(3) Procedural impropriety (or denial of natural justice).
The rules of natural justice fall within three principles:
(1) No person is to be condemned unheard (Audi alterum partum). In Ridge v Baldwin (1964) R was the chief constable of Brighton. He had been acquitted on a charge of conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice. The Brighton watch committee then dismissed him, using a statutory power to dismiss “any constable whom they think negligent in the charge of his duty or otherwise unfit for the same”.
He was not given the opportunity to appear before a watch committee or otherwise state his case. His dismissal was held t be void. R had a right to be heard in his own defence.
Prior to Ridge v Baldwin it was thought that rules of natural justice applied only to court proceedings. This makes it clear that they also apply to administrative decision making. As professor Yardley has written, the rules of natural justice “are we the practical reminders of that somewhat abstract concept, the rule of law”.

There are two rights: to know the case against you; and to put your side of the argument. There must also be time to prepare a case: R v Thames Magistrates”court, ex parte polemis (1974). A summons was served at 10.30 AM. Magistrates refused an adjournment, merely putting the case back from 2.00 pm to 4 pm the same day. The defendant was convicted and appealed to the divisional court, which quashed the conviction because natural justice requires that a party shall have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a case before being required to present it.
The right to be heard generally includes a right to legal representation: Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association (1971 (but there are exceptions
: Maynard v Osmond (1976) police officers involved in disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to a lawyer).
(2) No person may be a judge in his or her own cause ( nemo judex In causa sua )
In Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Company Proprietors (1852) the Lord Chancellor confirmed orders, including an injunction in favor of the canal company of which he was a shareholder. It was held that the orders should be quashed, not because the Lord Chancellor had actually been influenced by his financial interest but because no one having a financial interest should be involved in making judicial decision.
The interest involved must be direct and substantial. It does not have to be financial.
In R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1942) Lord Hewart CJ said “it is…of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubedly be seen to be done.”
In R v Altrincham Justices, ex parte Pennington (1975)
The applicants supplied vegetables to schools. They were prosecuted and convicted for weights and mesuares offences. The chair of the bench of magistrates was a member of the Education committee and governor of two schools. The conviction was quashed because the magistrate’s interest was sufficient to raise the possibility of bias.
Lord Denning MR said in Metropolitan Properties v a LANNON (1969): “Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: The judge was biased”.

(3) Legitimate E expectation. This issue arises, for example, in cases were the inland Revenue have advised a taxpayer that a certain course of action will have certain tax consequences and have then changed there mind. The court will not prevent a body from enforcing the law but it will prevent unfair behavior which does not provide any benefit to the public.

In the GCHQ case (1985) it was argued that the workers had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to union members. Lord Diplock said: “even where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has no legal right to it, as a matter of private law, he may have a legitimate expectation of receiving the benefit of privilege, and, if so, the courts will protect his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public law… Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue,” The House of Lords decided that this legitimate expectation was outweighed by national security considerations.
The courts have also begun to adopt the principle of proportionality, borrowed from EC Law. A judge will decide whether what was done was as bad in proportion to the whole issue as to require that the decision be declared void. In R v Legal Aid Board, ex parte Donn & co (1996) the legal Aid Board were awarding a contract to a firm of solicitors to conduct litigation on behalf of people claiming they were suffering from Gulf War Syndrome. The court found there had been procedural irregularities and decided that. Even though quashing the board’s decision and requiring them to go through the procedure correctly would delay the litigation, this was not disproportionate.
The remedies available are the prerogative orders of:
Certiorari (quashing a decision)
Prohibition (forbidding a proposed course of action)
Mandamus (ordering that something be done)
Declaration (the court decides and declares what the law is)
Injunction (usually interlocutory)


1. Introduction

All criminal courts have a general and inherent power to stay proceedings in order to protect their process from abuse and to secure fair treatment for those accused of crime.

This common law power was recognised in Connelly v DPP, where Lord Reid stated the court had ‘a residual discretion to prevent anything which savours of abuse of process’.

In more recent times in R v Beckford High Court stated that ‘ that the courts have the power and the duty to protect the law by protecting its own purposes and functions’.

Since the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, direct regard should also be had to article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) and the related Strasbourg jurisprudence.


In R v Derby Crown Court ex p Brooks Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
“ It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution have manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation or conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable”

The ultimate objective of this discretionary power is to ensure that there should be a fair trial according to law, which involves fairness both to the defendant and the prosecution.

In line with the above observations, proceedings are only stayed, in the words of Viscount Dilhorne in DPP v Humphrys, in
‘exceptional circumstances.’

The Test
The test to be applied is that of fairness.

Lord Justice Neill in R v Beckford, observed that;

“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless two main strands can be detected in the authorities:
a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial;
b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.”

What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.

When an application is made for proceedings to be stayed, consideration should be given to the process by which the defendant was brought to court, including:

- the time delay involved,
- the disclosure and preservation of evidence,
- the rule of law,
- the methods used by state officials to investigate and prosecute the offence,
- any surrounding publicity and
- the ability of a defendant to participate in the proceedings.

2. Abuse of process at the police station

Overriding of client privilege 1)

One striking example is the Court of Appeal treatment of eavesdropping in Grant.

In quashing the appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to murder, the Court of Appeal observed that deliberate eavesdropping upon legally privileged communications was unlawful and capable of infecting the proceedings as an abuse of the court’s process.

LPP, section 58 PACE and RIPA
In Re McE v Prison Service of Northern Ireland, the House of Lords decided that the covert surveillance provisions of Part II RIPA 2000 apply to electronic surveillance, carried out by the police, of conversations between lawyers and their client suspect, in police stations and prisons, which are ordinarily protected by legal professional privilege and the suspects right to consult privately with a lawyer (under section 58 PACE).

The House of Lords recognised that LLP is a fundamental human right, subject to authorized covert surveillance.

Breach of promise 2)
A witness who is not a a) suspect

R v Croydon Justices ex p Dean.

Lord Justice Staughton stated that
‘the prosecution of a person who has received a promise, undertaking or representation from police that he will not be prosecuted is capable of being an abuse of process.’

Charge following legitimate b) expectation of caution
Private prosecution
In Jones v Whalley the House of Lords held that to allow a private prosecution of a man who had received a Police caution (for an assault) which explicitly informed him that he would not go before a criminal court represented an abuse of process.

The Police officer’s decision to offer a formal caution complied with Home Office guidance and aimed to deal quickly and simply with less serious offenders to divert them from unnecessary appearance in the criminal courts and to reduce their chances of re-offending.

All worthwhile policy objectives. If the officer’s decision to caution rather than to prosecute was untenable it could be set aside on judicial review.

It would offend the courts sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the face of the assurance given by the Police, that he would have to go to court in respect of the offence. To go behind that assurance would undermine the cautioning regime.

3. Disclosure

Fair disclosure of information to an accused, by the prosecution, is ‘an inseparable part of a fair trial’, under article 6 ECHR.

A failure on the part of the prosecution to make proper disclosure may result, in appropriate circumstances, in proceedings being stayed as an abuse of process.

CPIA 1996 (as amended by CJA 2003)
The CPIA 1996 imposes a statutory regime on criminal trials at all levels in cases where the investigation has commenced on or after 1 April 1997, with related case law (see The House of Lords in R v H and C).

The foundation of the system is the duty to record and retain all relevant material obtained in the course of an investigation. Thereafter, the prosecution must disclose anything which might undermine the defence case by way of primary disclosure. The defence may then provide a written defence statement which is the basis upon which the prosecutor decides whether there is any material which might reasonably be expected to assist the defence in a process of disclosure.

Disclosure Protocol

On 20 February 2006 a new disclosure protocol was published and came into force, covering all cases in the Crown Court. Its tone may best be appreciated from the conclusion: the public rightly expects that the delays and failures which have been present in some cases in the past where there has been scant adherence to sound disclosure principles will be eradicated by observation of this Protocol.

The new regime under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 gives judges the power to change the culture in which such cases are tried. It is now the duty of every judge actively to manage disclosure issues in every case. The judge must seize the initiative and drive the case along towards an efficient, effective and timely resolution, having regard to the overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules (Part 1). In this way the interests of justice will be better served and public confidence in the criminal justice system will be increased.

Disclosure problems

A failure on the part of the prosecution to make proper disclosure might result in appropriate circumstances in proceedings being stayed as an abuse of process. However, not all failures to disclose would automatically render a trial unfair.

Applications to stay proceedings based on complaints of non-disclosure should consider the following issues:
(a) whether the failure to disclose was due to inadvertence, inefficiency or deliberate conduct;
(b) whether the prosecutor had acted in good faith;
(c) whether the non-disclosure could damage the prosecution case or advance that of the defence;
(d) the extent of any prejudice to the accused in the conduct of his or her defence as a result of the non-disclosure;
(e) whether the accused could nevertheless receive a fair trial without undue delay;
(f) whether remedies short of a stay could achieve a fair trial (such as an adjournment to allow disclosure and instructions to be taken on the new disclosure, and the exclusion of evidence);
(g) at appeal level whether taking all the circumstances of the trial into account, there was a real possibility that the jury would have arrived at a different verdict.

Disclosure failure cases

1. Disclosure problems in Customs cases

In recent years a number of Customs prosecutions have been stayed as an abuse, based on disclosure problems.
(a) London City Bond cases

In R v Early and others, the Court of Appeal quashed convictions where (1) prosecution witnesses lied in evidence in public interest immunity (PII) and abuse of process hearings and (2) the prosecution had failed to make proper disclosure, including a failure on its part to disclose the role of informants, who were facilitating the frauds.

(b) ‘Creeping’, piecemeal, drip-fed disclosure

In R v Lindsay and others HHJ Pontinus stayed proceedings as an abuse of process because of problems with ‘creeping’ disclosure.

The case involved a Customs & Excise investigation into a Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) VAT ‘carousel’ fraud, codenamed Operation Vitric.

In staying the indictment His Honour Judge Pontius expressed concern about the piece meal disclosure which took place in the case, described by the defence as ‘drip-fed’ or ‘creeping’ disclosure. The Customs disclosure system had failed to produce the degree of efficient, exhaustive disclosure that a large and complex case demands. He concluded that it could justifiably be said that the larger and more complex the case, the greater the burden of responsibility upon the prosecuting authority to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to the task of full, comprehensive disclosure.

(c) ‘Kept in the dark’

In R v Uddin, another MTIC VAT carousel fraud, was stayed as an abuse of process, because of Customs prosecution disclosure failures.

The trial judge Mr Justice Crane concluded that the prosecution failed to comply with their disclosure duties under sections 3 and 7 CPIA 1996, the Attorney-General Disclosure Guidelines (November 2000), the HMCE disclosure guidance document and the Investigation Handbook.

There were deficiencies in the disclosure of material relating to the reliability and credibility of prosecution witnesses

Mr Justice Crane went on to consider whether there was deliberate malpractice on the part of the prosecution. Having heard live evidence from Customs officers he was not impressed with their performance, being ‘driven to the conclusion that the court has not been told the truth’

4. Entrapment
There is a judicial discretion to stay proceedings where an offence has been incited by another.

There are two broad categories of entrapment.
Executive 1) state entrapment

House of Lords decision in R v Looseley and Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 2000.

The House of Lords considered what conduct by undercover police officers, in obtaining evidence against a drugs dealer, will constitute entrapment of such a nature that either a prosecution based on that evidence will be stayed as an abuse of process or the evidence excluded under section 78 PACE.

Lord Nicholls giving the first judgment, of the House of Lords, observed:
“1) ...It is simply not acceptable that the state through its agents should lure its citizens into committing acts forbidden by the law and then seek to prosecute them for doing so. That would be entrapment. That would be a misuse of state power, and an abuse of the process of the courts....The role of the courts is to stand between the state and its citizen and make sure this does not happen.
2) ... The difficulty lies in identifying conduct, which is caught by such imprecise words as lure or incite or entice or instigate. If police officers acted only as detectives and passive observers, there would be little problem in identifying the boundary between permissible and impermissible police conduct. But that would not be a satisfactory place for the boundary line... in some instances a degree of active involvement by the police in the commission of a crime is generally regarded as acceptable... Test purchases fall easily into this category
3) ...
4) Thus, there are occasions when it is necessary for the police to resort to investigatory techniques ... Sometimes the particular technique adopted is acceptable. Sometimes it is not. For even when the use of these investigatory techniques is justified, there are limits to what is acceptable. Take a case where an undercover policeman repeatedly badgers a vulnerable drug addict for a supply of drugs in return for excessive and ever increasing amounts of money. Eventually the addict yields to the importunity and pressure, and supplies drugs. He is then prosecuted for doing so. Plainly, this result would be objectionable.

In the Attorney-General’s Reference No 3 of 2000 Lord Hutton agreed with the trial judge’s decision to stay the proceedings. The defendant had not previously dealt in heroin. He was induced to procure heroin for the undercover officer by the prospect of a profitable trade in smuggled cigarettes. The judge was entitled to take the view that the police had caused the defendant to commit an offence which he would not otherwise have committed.

Commercial/private entrapment 2)
Crimes may also be incited and created by individuals other than state officials, constituting a form of private entrapment. The actions and activities of the private individual, notably tabloid journalists, may carry on outside state controlled perimeters, with no authority, supervision or endorsement (at least at the time of the commission of the offence) by law enforcement agencies.

Section 78 of PACE is the appropriate means of dealing with private entrapment see R v Morley and Hutton .

5. Delay

The common law provides that a fair hearing must be timely:
see Connelly v DPP.

The right to a trial within a reasonable time has been enshrined, in broad terms, in articles 5(3) and 6(1) of the ECHR.

Common Law and Prejudice

Delay per se is insufficient. The essential elements of granting relief in delay cases are inordinate delay and prejudice.

It must be shown that the delay had produced genuine prejudice and unfairness. In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1990), Lord Chief Justice Lane observed:

(1) that generally speaking a prosecutor has as much right as a defendant to demand a verdict of a jury on an outstanding indictment and, where either demands a verdict, a judge has no jurisdiction to stand in the way of it and therefore the jurisdiction to stay proceedings is exceptional;

(2) a stay should never be imposed where the delay has been caused by the complexity of the proceedings

(3) it would be rare for a stay to be imposed in the absence of fault on the part of the prosecutor or complainant;

(4) delay contributed to by the actions of the defendant should not found the basis of a stay;

(5) the defendant needs to show on a balance of probabilities that owing to the delay he will suffer serious prejudice to the extent that no fair trial can be held. In other words, the continuance of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. In assessing whether there is likely to be prejudice and if so whether it can properly be described as serious, the following matters should be borne in mind: first, the power of the judge at common law and under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to regulate the admissibility of evidence; secondly, the trial process itself, which should ensure that all relevant factual issues arising from the delay will be placed before the jury as part of the evidence for their consideration, together with the powers of the judge to give appropriate directions to the jury before they consider their verdict.

Trial process

The trial process itself is able, in many situations, to deal with the prejudice caused by long delays.

Trial judges can use their discretion to exclude evidence, under PACE s78 and/or give an appropriate direction to the jury in the summing-up, to remedy any prejudice to the defence caused by delay, as an alternative to staying proceedings.

Such alternative remedies were recognised by Latham LJ in Maybery. .

Although it is desirable to warn the jury of such problems, failure to do so will not automatically lead to a conviction being quashed.

Court of Appeal guidance in delay cases
R v S
The correct approach for a judge to whom an application for a stay of proceedings, based upon delay, was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v S.

Lord Justice Rose set out five principles which need to be considered:
1) even where delay was unjustifiable, a permanent stay should be the exception rather than the rule;
2) where there was no fault on the part of the complainant or the prosecution, it would be very rare for a stay to be granted;
3) no stay should be granted in the absence of serious prejudice to the defence so that no fair trial could be held;
4) when assessing possible serious prejudice, the judge should bear in mind his or her power to regulate the admissibility of evidence and that the trial process itself should ensure that all relevant factual issues arising from delay would be placed before the jury for their consideration in accordance with appropriate directions from the judge;
5) if, having considered all those factors, a judge’s assessment was that a fair trial would be possible, a stay should not be granted.

6. Non-availability of evidence

Where evidence has been lost or destroyed and the defence has been deprived of a potential opportunity to advance its case, the court has a discretion to stay proceedings.


The Divisional Court in R v Feltham Magistrates’ Court ex p Ebrahim, Mouat v DPP gave guidance as to the approach courts should adopt when faced with the non-availability of evidence at trial – with specific reference to video-tape evidence;
● First, the court should consider the duty, if any, of the investigator or prosecutor to obtain, retain, and preserve the evidence. Reference to the Code of Practice published pursuant to sections 23 and 25 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the Attorney-General’s disclosure guidelines.
● Second, if there was no such duty before the defence first sought retention, there could be no question of a subsequent trial being unfair.
● Third, if the material had not been retained in accordance with the code or guidelines the following principles should be applied: (i) the ultimate objective was to ensure a fair trial to both the defence and prosecution (ii) trial procedural safeguards could deal with the bulk of complaints (iii) if there was sufficient credible evidence which, if believed, could sustain a safe conviction, the trial should proceed. A stay should not be granted unless the defence could show prejudice to the extent that a fair trial could not be had.

● Fourth, the proceedings could be stayed if the behaviour of the prosecution was so bad – in terms of bad faith or serious fault – that it was not fair to try the defendant (as per the second limb in Beckford).

7. Unfair Conduct, abuse of executive power
Protecting the integrity of the court

The leading case in this area is R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett Lord Lowry observed:
“I consider that a court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the grounds that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a particular case.”

8. Adverse publicity

Media-generated notoriety can prejudice an accused and this may lead to a jury being discharged, an indictment being stayed or a conviction being quashed because of adverse publicity. Such adverse media coverage may also give rise to a breach of the right to a fair trial under article 6(1) of the ECHR and lead to contempt of court proceedings against the offending publisher.

The test
In R v McCann, Cullen and Shanahan, the principle was enunciated that if the media coverage at trial had created a real risk of prejudice against the defendants, any subsequent convictions should be regarded as unsafe and unsatisfactory.

Prejudice and judicial direction

In R v Central Criminal Court ex p The Telegraph PLC Lord Chief Justice Taylor stated:
“In determining whether publication of matter would cause a substantial risk of prejudice to a future trial, a court should credit the jury with the will and ability to abide by the judge’s direction to decide the case only on the evidence before them.”

Judicial direction
The use of judicial direction as a remedy against adverse publicity was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in R v Abu Hamza. Lord Phillips endorsed the following statement made by the President of the Queen’s Bench Division (Sir Igor Judge):
“[32] ….juries up and down the country have a passionate and profound belief in, and a commitment to, the right of a defendant to be given a fair trial. They know that it is integral to their responsibility. It is, when all is said and done, their birthright; it is shared by each one of them with the defendant. They guard it faithfully. The integrity of the jury is an essential feature of our trial process. Juries follow the directions which the judge will give them to focus exclusively on the evidence and to ignore anything they may have heard or read out of court”.

The Court of Appeal rejected the adverse publicity grounds of appeal.
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